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On 27 October 2019, the Peronist presidential ticket of Alberto Fernández and Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner obtained victory in the first round of national elections, with 8 
per cent more votes than President Mauricio Macri, who was seeking reelection. After 
a brief interregnum of Macri’s four-year term, the Peronists – who had previously been 
in government for 12 consecutive years – will return to power in December. This time 
they will govern within a severely constraining situation, far away from the commodi-
ties boom that boosted redistribution policies during the “pink tide.” 
 • Macri failed to deliver on his economic promises, and the coming government will face 
imminent debt services, in a context of high inflation. However, the elected and ruling 
presidents initiated the political transition with a cooperative attitude, facilitated by a 
calmed dollar after the adoption of strong controls to the exchange rate.  
 • Despite unsuccessful economics, Macri was able to retain more than 40 per cent of the 
vote. He won in six provinces, four of which are among the most populous and economi-
cally dynamic. The more modern and better-off portions of the electorate, which were 
less affected by the crisis, also voted in support of a balanced distribution of power and 
checks on the executive.
 • Of the four governorships that renewed concurrently with the national elections, Macri 
retained just the City of Buenos Aires. He lost to the Frente de Todos the populous Bue-
nos Aires province. The Peronists will govern in 14 provinces, of which 11 reelected their 
governors in spread elections throughout 2019. 
 • A crucial factor is how President-elect Fernández will deal with internal rivalries, espe-
cially with his vice-president. It is likely that the internal opposition will check the presi-
dent as much as the external one, which is a recurrent feature in Peronist governments. 
Policy Implications
Argentina has a long history of political instability, being particularly vulnerable under 
critical socioeconomic conditions. When stability is not a systemic feature, actors’ strate-
gies make the difference, and governing in hard times may be challenging, even for the 
party that has been used to deliver the longest spells in power. In 2019, the prospect of 
party alternation has helped to keep discontent away from the streets, but a slow (or 
non-existent) economic recovery will clash with impatient demands and expectations. 
Argentines may decide for party alternations in the midterm. In the short term, the main-
tenance of political cooperation seems crucial.
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The Peronists’ Comeback 
On sunday, 27 October 2019, Argentines elected a new president. The Alberto 
Fernández-Cristina Fernández de Kirchner ticket ended ruling President Mauricio 
Macri’s re-election intentions by gaining 48.1 per cent of the votes, and almost 8 
per cent of difference, in the first round. In December, when Macri’s four-year term 
comes to an end, the Peronists will return to power, this time under the label Frente 
de Todos (Front of All). Peronism ruled before Macri for 12 consecutive years, first 
under the leadership of President néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and then under his 
wife, President Cristina F. de Kirchner (2007–2011, 2011–2015). In 2015, Macri, 
then the mayor of Buenos Aires, won the presidential contest with a market-friendly 
programme and headed the centre-right coalition Cambiemos (today Together for 
the Change, Juntos por el Cambio), which included his own party (republican Pro-
posal, or PrO, created in 2005), the old radical Civic union and other small politi-
cal forces. Macri’s promises embraced the repair of his predecessor’s policies and 
mistakes regarding inflation, slowing growth, crime and corruption.     
Macri’s re-election ambitions failed as his government was unable to deliver, 
precisely, on the economic front. Argentina’s situation today includes huge debt, 
economic recession, rising unemployment, high levels of poverty and one of the 
highest inflation rates in the world. In many countries of the region, citizens have 
taken to the streets to protests against adjustment policies; in Argentina, people 
expressed their discontent massively, but peacefully, while voting for the political 
alternative. The winning Peronist front developed a successful electoral strategy by 
bringing together different streams that had been fragmented in their opposition to 
President Macri. This gamble paid off convincingly for the disenchanted electorate 
when Alberto Fernández was nominated as the presidential candidate. He had been 
the chief of the Ministers’ Cabinet during néstor Kirchner’s presidency (2003–
2007), and also briefly during Cristina Fernández’s presidency (2007–2008). The 
still very popular, but polarizing ex-president, now senator for Buenos Aires prov-
ince, relinquished the presidential position to Alberto Fernández and threw her pol-
itical leverage into a decision to run for the vice presidency. 
In a context of polarization, Fernández’s candidacy represented a credible, 
moderate move to the political centre, mostly because of the critical stance he had 
previously maintained with Cristina Fernández’s governments. Cristina, along with 
several of her ministers, is facing corruption charges in the courts, but in the cur-
rent critical context this did not prevent most voters from supporting the Front of 
All. Interestingly, despite a bad economic performance, Macri was able to retain 
more than 40 per cent of the votes. This significant part of the electorate, which 
includes much of the middle-class and the well-off – who were less affected by the 
crisis – also supported Macri’s political offer, which was the need to impose checks 
to power and dismiss hegemonic dreams. In fact, the political scenario is balanced, 
and two heterogeneous poles can be distinguished. If they hold, not only will the 
new president need to govern seeking compromises, but Argentines will also have 
an electorate alternative in the future. However, the dual leadership at the head of 
the elected executive suggests conflicts will come sooner rather than later in the 
Peronist front. It is similarly difficult to see the opposition easily maintaining unity 
behind the outgoing president with a number of ambitious figures to dispute his 
leadership in both the PrO and the radical Civic union. 
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Argentines have been voting every two years since 1983. The latest vibrant dem-
ocratic exercise contrasts with a disappointing economic performance. A couple of 
days after the elections, on the occasion of a new anniversary of raúl Alfonsín’s 
election (the beloved president of the democratic transition), Alberto Fernández 
claimed that his commitment as president was “to begin to pay off the debt Alfonsín 
indicated to us: that everyone can eat, heal, and be educated in Argentina” (Twitter, 
@alferdez, 30.10.19). However, will the new president be able to deliver where his 
predecessors could not? A presidential inauguration always presents an opportu-
nity, but the constraints, both political and economic, are many.
Ruling in Hard Times
While ruling, Latin American presidents need to pay attention to both external and 
internal challenges. Academic studies have shown that presidential success in Latin 
America is largely determined by factors beyond the presidents’ control, notably 
commodity prices and us interest rates. [1] The end of the latest commodity boom, 
which extended from the mid-2000s to the mid-2010s, is equally confronting Latin 
American governments to situations of slow growth, the need to reduce spending, and 
the difficulty repaying debts. Governments are supposed to react accordingly – that 
is, to shift policies to adopt unpopular, though often necessary, economic adjust-
ments – but the social consequences of such decisions are costly. In the last few 
weeks we have seen vulnerable sectors and the middle-classes moving to the streets 
to protest against worsening social conditions all over the region. We have also seen 
anti-incumbent tendencies in voting, as happened in Argentina and will probably 
happen in uruguay’s second round. 
President Macri assumed power in 2015 with limited institutional resources. 
His economic decisions accounted more for the internal than for the abovemen-
tioned external constraints. Macri obtained his presidential victory in 2015 by a 
narrow margin – about 700,000 votes – in the run-off election against Daniel scio-
li, the Peronist candidate to succeed President Cristina F. de Kirchner. The concur-
rent congressional elections did not favour Macri’s electoral alliance in either of 
the chambers and the alliance won just five out of 24 Argentine provinces. In presi-
dential systems, constraining institutional scenarios impose several challenges to 
presidential agendas. If presidents do not show context sensitivity and a sense of 
timing to calibrate their reform ambitions, they get into trouble with the many ac-
tors who hold veto powers in the political system. In Argentina, such inability has 
not only confined presidents to stalemates and lost elections, but also to premature 
departures from power. 
Macri’s economic decisions led to the expression gradualismo to describe 
what was seen as a gradual or partial approach to economic adjustment and reform 
(Freytes and niedzwiecki 2018). Macri won the elections by presenting himself as 
an alternative to the weakening economic performance of the previous government, 
which had led to an economy that was semi-closed, prone to recession, and infla-
tionary. In the first months, his government took measures to reopen the economy 
and reached a pending agreement with creditors, which permitted a return to ex-
ternal sources of funding. The government also removed subventions to public ser-
vices that resulted in higher costs for the middle class (and aggravated inflation). 
1 The good scenario 
is represented by high 
commodity prices and 
low US interest rates. The 
former increases export 
earnings and attract direct 
investment, while the 
latter encourages financial 
capital flows to emerging 
countries. See Campello 
and Zucco (2015).
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However, reforms progressed slowly and contradictorily. Fearing social costs, for 
example, social benefits and transferences for vulnerable sectors established dur-
ing the previous governments were maintained, while export taxes were removed 
or relaxed to honour electoral promises with rural producers. such “gradual” eco-
nomic decisions initially had positive effects and confirmed the electorate’s support 
in the 2017 midterm legislative elections. However, the fiscal and the external fronts 
weakened and Argentina became more vulnerable to potentially hardening external 
conditions. 
The economic adjustment eventually came in 2018, and it did so abruptly along 
with international turbulence. Macri experienced the challenge of an open economy 
in a difficult environment. episodes of capital outflows and currency devaluation 
led to an agreement with the IMF that had harsh conditions, such as a commitment 
to “zero deficit.” Macri was convinced that the tough measures were necessary, but 
temporary, and that a new phase of investments and growth would follow the hard 
times. He hoped that the positive effects of the economic adjustment would become 
noticeable during 2019, an election year. However, the zero deficit target eventu-
ally drove him away from his government’s initial “zero poverty” goals and poverty 
increased again with the 2018 financial turbulence. In Argentina, sharp currency 
depreciations drive higher inflation, which in turn drives a steep fall in purchasing 
power (LArr 2019: 2). 
In 2019, the worsening economic situation led to many defeats for the gov-
ernment at subnational elections throughout the year: the national coalition only 
won in three provinces (Jujuy, Mendoza, and the City of Buenos Aires), while the 
Peronists won in 14 provinces (11 provinces re-elected the governor). The negative 
trend for the government was manifested unexpectedly intense in primary elec-
tions of August 11, where Macri/Pichetto obtained 15 per cent fewer votes than 
Fernández/F. de Kirchner. The reaction of the financial market to the prospect of a 
Peronist comeback was stormy: the dollar climbed to 58 pesos, a sudden 20 per cent 
increase, causing a new inflationary jump. This led to the replacement of the min-
ister of economy, a rescheduling of the debt, and the return to (limited) exchange 
controls. In the days before the October elections, the dollar climbed again, driving 
the government to adopt further currency controls in fear of the dangerous effects 
of uncertainty in the transition between administrations.
During the October presidential debates (Llanos 2019), the ruling president 
blamed the long Argentine history of inflation and the economic disorder of the 
previous administrations for the crisis, which would be difficult to repair in a short 
four-year term. However, Macri’s approach to the long-term challenges was uncon-
vincing for voters on both the left and the right. Fernandez’ inheritance is a delicate 
economic situation, an adverse international scenario, and a balanced distribution 
of the institutional power, which should be added to the internal constraints coming 
from his own base of support.
The Institutional Scene
The institutional resources and constraints that Argentine presidents need to deal 
with include the popular vote, the legislature and the provincial governorship. The 
results for elected President Fernández are favourable, but not excesive at the three 
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instances. The previous Primarias Abiertas, Simultáneas y Obligatorias (primary 
elections, PAsO) held in August had actually anticipated a less balanced scenario. 
However, in the presidential elections Fernández roughly maintained the primary 
supports, while Macri’s effort to improve his primary results – with the campaign 
Sí se puede across the country – bore fruit as he reached 40 per cent and 8 per cent 
more than he had previously received. In addition, according to the national elec-
toral Direction, the voter turnout hit 80 per cent, while in the primaries it had been 
75 per cent. Although this improved performance was not enough to secure him 
another term, Macri won in six provinces, four of which are among the most popu-
lous and economically dynamic, particularly in the agroexport business: Córdoba, 
santa Fe, the City of Buenos Aires, and Mendoza (see Figure 1). In the primaries, 
Macri had only succeded in Córdoba and the city of Buenos Aires. However, the 
president’s campaign efforts did not help in the Buenos Aires province, now gov-
erned by his copartisan Maria eugenia vidal, who has a very strong public image. 
Buenos Aires, with 37 per cent of the national electorate and a historical bastion of 
Peronism, particularly in the poor and populated cord of cities surrounding the City 
of Buenos Aires, is always crucial for defining a presidential election and also mas-
sively exposed to economic hardships. The province supported the Front of All with 
52.13 per cent of the votes.
In the Congress, which renews half of the chamber and one-third of the senate 
 every two years, the resulting seat distribution is again favourable to the new presi-
dent, but not excessively so (Figure 2 and 3). Considering the entire Chamber of 
Deputies composition, 120 members will be from the Front of All, slightly short of 
the required majority to initiate a session (129 deputies). At the same time, Mauri-
cio Macri’s alliance was also strengthened. Juntos por el Cambio received 56 seats 
and will have 119 deputies in total. The strength of the opposition will naturally de-
pend on its ability to hold together, but its presence will lead to consensus-building, 
especially if the new president is unable to hold together his own front of supports. 
In the eight provinces that held elections for the senate, the Peronists won 15 seats 
and the radicals 8. That Fernández’s Front has more seats in the senate is not 
surprising, as Peronists historically receive a highly disproportionate share of the 
senate in the smaller districts, which are usually less competitive and more likely to 
vote for them (Malamud and De Luca 2016).
Figure 1 
Electoral Results for 
President by Province
Source: Authors’ 
elaboration from data 
available at the National 
Electoral Chamber, 
Diario Clarín, and La 
Nación.
   6    GIGA FOCus | LATIn AMerICA | nO. 6 | nOveMBer 2019 
The overwhelming importance of national elections normally puts subnational elec-
tions in the second stage. However, Argentina is a federal country and provincial 
politics are crucial for national politics. Presidents need to obtain the governor’s 
support, for both financial and political reasons, as governors influence not only 
candidate selection but also the behaviour of their national legislators (Kikuchi and 
Lodola 2014). Governors’ demands are primarily attached to the province, then to 
the party. Thus, their support for the national government is never unconditional, 
particularly in critical times. In 2019, 24 governors finished their terms. As presi-
dential elections have important coattails, governors became strategic with the set-
ting of the provincial electoral landscape. Provincial electoral institutions are not 
uniform across the country and governors have many institutional resources to en-
hance their chances, or those of their parties. A characteristic of the 2019 electoral 
round was the dispersion of provincial elections in the calendar year from March 
onwards. Governors sought to cushion the effect of the national elections, where the 
scenario looked uncertain due to the economic situation. 
Figure 4 shows the 2019 results for provincial elections, as well as their po-
sition in the year’s calendar. Only four provinces (city of Buenos Aires, Province 
of Buenos Aires, Catamarca, and La rioja) held elections on the same date as the 
national elections in October. Alberto Fernández could use the piecemeal electoral 
process and the early provincial results to build connections with the governors. As 
he lacks his own party structure within Peronism, he opted for a federal message in 
his political campaign. This was also interpreted as opening the path that Cristina 
Figure 2 
Seat Distribution – 
Chamber of Deputies
Source: Authors’ elab-
oration from the data 
available in the National 
Electoral Chamber.
Note: English transla-
tions for: Front of All 
(Frente de Todos), 
Together for Change 
(Juntos por el Cambio), 
Other Peronist Streams 
(Peronismo no K), Third 
Way (Tercera Vía), Left 
(Izquierda).
Figure 3 
Seat Distribution – 
Senate
Source: Authors’ elab-
oration from the data 
available in the National 
Electoral Chamber.
Note: English transla-
tions for: Front of All 
(Frente de Todos), 
Together for Change 
(Juntos por el Cambio), 
Other Peronist Streams 
(Peronismo no K), Third 
Way (Tercera Vía), Left 
(Izquierda).
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F. de Kirchner had not been able to follow; that is, one of recomposing Peronists’ 
unity with provincial leaders with whom she had broken up in 2017. In that year she 
had decided to run for the senate, forming her own electoral coalition (unidad Ciu-
dadana). As Peronists have won the governorships in most provinces (14 governor-
ships, as noted above), the starting point is, in principle, favourable to Fernández.
Challenges Ahead
There are short-term and long-term challenges ahead for Argentina. The former 
concerns the presidential transition from October to December, when the transfer 
of power takes place. That the six-week uncertainty could become risky in the con-
text of crisis was a known fact for Argentines who, on Monday 28th, were attentive 
to the final electoral results, but also to the dollar rate. Foreseen financial reactions 
motivated the adoption of a further step in the controls of the exchange rate. There 
is also the concomitant fear of social unrest. Protests have spread in neighbouring 
countries in recent weeks, for reasons that resemble those driving Argentines to 
vote for a presidential change. Argentina has a lot of experience with protests in 
the recent past – in 1989, President Alfonsín (1983–1989) resigned in a context of 
social unrest due to hyperinflation, and in 2001 President de la rúa (1999–2001) 
resigned amid economic crisis and social and political turmoil. Orderly departures 
from power and coordinated mandate transfers have not been the rule in contem-
porary Argentine politics. Given the current critical conditions, the initial signals 
of disposition that the outgoing and the coming teams have shown to coordinate 
efforts in order to smooth the transition are signals of civic maturity.
The long-term challenge concerns the new government’s ability to drive Argen-
tina out of this crisis. On the positive side, a freshly elected president may be in a 
better position to fight the emergency than a worn-out president who is finishing a 
four-year term in dismay. In addition, the Peronists have historically had more abil-
ity to control the streets, partly due to their closer relation with social movements, 
and have had more institutional resources at their disposal. The distribution of the 
institutional power described in the previous section is favourable to Fernández, 
but compromises will be unavoidable. Fernández has defined himself as pragmatic, 
suggesting he is ready to take the necessary measures to fight the crisis. This is 
a credible description for a Peronist leader: in the 1990s, the Peronists leaned to 
Figure 4 
Results and Provin-
cial Electoral Calen-
dar in 2019
Source: Authors’ 
elaboration with data 
from the National Elec-
toral Directorate, Diario 
Clarín and La Nación.
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the right with Carlos Menem (1989–1999) and to the left in the 2000s with the 
Kirchners. As the situation gives Fernández little room for policy manoeuvring, and 
the constraining context is more favourable to adjustment than redistribution, we 
cannot expect a radical return to the booming 2000s. The imminent debt services 
look troubling for creditors, given that Argentina has defaulted on the debt in the 
past, but in the current context renegotiation looks more likely than default. At least 
Fernandez repeatedly expressed in his campaign that he would renegotiate with the 
IMF, and concretely suggested rescheduling the debt due dates. The us secretary 
of Treasury has already declared that their expectation is a commitment to the IMF. 
On the other hand, the difficult economic scenario will bring tension with the 
bases and the Peronist streams. In electoral campaign, the Front for All promised 
to take the country away from liberal economics for ever. When the challenge is the 
administration of scarce resources, adjustment measures will be adopted sooner or 
later and the presidential constraints will probably come at first from his own Front. 
The differences between the internal streams that compose the Front will become 
apparent, leaders will clash, and cohabitation with a powerful vice-president will be 
tested as well as the president’s ability to keep the governors under control. 
The latest election was a vibrant exercise in peaceful participation, despite 
disenchantment with the ruling president and the declining satisfaction and sup-
port for democracy that is exhibited in recent opinion polls (Zechmeister and Lupu 
2019). Presidents have many institutional resources in Argentina, but they also need 
material resources to gain and maintain allies, and to keep the voters’ confidence. 
It is regrettable that, in the electoral campaign, none of the presidential candidates 
dedicated much time to define the development path, the direction that would allow 
Argentina to improve its weak material foundations. nor was much attention paid 
to what will be the insertion of Argentina in a changing international environment. 
However, great advancements are noticeable in the political realm. In a country 
with a long-term pattern of political instability, it is remarkable that Argentines 
went to the polls seeking party alternation and also that President Macri is finish-
ing his term normally, despite adverse conditions. When political stability is not 
a systemic feature, actors’ strategies make the difference, and governing in hard 
times may be challenging, even for a party or alliance such as Peronism that is ac-
customed to delivering the longest spells in power. In the losing scenario, Macri’s 
centre-right alliance represents a democratic option for a considerable portion of 
the electorate and has an important representation in Congress. This may be the 
springboard for power alternation in the near future, especially if a slow (or lack 
of) economic improvement prevails and the coming government, as has happened 
many time in the past, does not find a way out of the crisis. Considering the turbu-
lent times Argentines have already experienced, the perspective of a future with 
party alternations seems comforting, if not promising. 
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